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Abstract
 
For much of the First Republic, the Italian Parliament was notorious for its fiscal 
irresponsibility. However, using data over a 20-year period we note that the performance 
of the Parliament during the passage of the national budget changed over time. During 
most the 1980s the Parliament always spent more than the amount specified in the 
government’s Budget Bill. But this trend slowed towards the late 1980s, and of particular 
interest is that for several years during the 1990s the Parliament voted to spend less than 
what the government originally proposed. We explain this anomaly using institutional 
theories and contextual explanations.  
 
Introduction 
 
Scholars have generally argued that governments in parliamentary systems fully control 
budgetary politics. In fact, in spite of the fact that parliaments may have the formal power 
to amend and approve the government budget proposal, parliaments’ role in the budget 
process is generally constrained not only by institutional dispositions concerning what 
parliaments are actually entitled to change in the budget but also and more importantly by 
political considerations. A parliament that fails to approve the government budget is 
effectively stating that the government no longer enjoys the confidence of the parliament 
and should be replaced. Possible as this scenario may be, it is not terribly common. 
Parliaments and parliamentary majorities approve government budget bills with only 
minor changes and governments can legitimately expect legislative deference on 
budgetary matters. However, under particular institutional and political conditions 
parliaments and parliamentarians may be provided with incentives to interfere with their 
government’s budgetary proposals.1 Scholars believe that this parliamentary interference 
in budgetary matters is generally fiscally irresponsible and leads to higher levels of 
spending. We call this argument the conventional wisdom of parliamentary budgeting 
(Tsebelis 2002:205).  
The transformation of the Italian parliament’s role in the budget process is 
particularly interesting in assessing the validity of these theoretical arguments. Looking at 
the 1982-2001 period, we note that the way the Italian Parliament treated the 
government’s budget changed over time. During most of the 1980s, the Parliament 
actively and aggressively challenged government proposals, leading to much greater 
                                                 
1 North (1990) explains how and why institutional factors influence the incentive structures that political 
actors face when making their decisions.  
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amounts of overall spending as one would expect in the light of the conventional wisdom. 
Yet, and more importantly, this trend came to an end beginning in the late-1980s and was 
even reversed for some years in the 1990s. We believe that this transformation should not 
be viewed as yet another instance of the (in)famous Italian exceptionalism. We believe 
instead that understanding the changing role that the Italian parliament has played in the 
budget process can shed some light as to whether, why and under what conditions the 
conventional wisdom does actually provide an accurate explanation of what parliaments 
actually do to the budget, but it also and more importantly illustrates that the 
conventional wisdom cannot be applied urbi et orbi. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate patterns of legislative-induced changes 
to budgetary bills in Italy between 1982 and 2001. In doing so, we will show that while in 
the 1980s the Italian Parliament greatly modified the budget and that the changes were 
fiscally irresponsible (meaning that the parliament passed a budget that spent more than 
the government’s original proposal), in the following decade the parliament-induced 
changes were much smaller and were in some instances fiscally responsible (meaning 
that the parliament passed a budget that spent less than the government’s original 
proposal). As this apparent paradox cannot be explained on the basis of the conventional 
wisdom, we think it is worthwhile investigating why the parliament made changes to the 
budget not only in degree (increasing spending by a lot vs. increasing spending by a little) 
but also in kind (increasing overall spending vs. decreasing overall spending). After 
presenting data concerning the parliament-induced chances in the budget, we will present 
an explanation as to why these changes occurred. In this respect, we argue that this 
transformation occurred because of the interactions of both institutional and contextual 
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factors. Specifically, with the transformation of parliamentary rules, electoral reform, the 
signing of the Maastricht treaty and the collapse of the so called First Republic, Italian 
MPs could no longer afford to be fiscally irresponsible. 
The paper is organized in four parts. Part One reviews the comparative literature 
of the Parliament’s role in the budget process. In this part we show that while different 
scholars have underlined the importance of different institutional arrangements to explain 
whether and to what extent the parliament is able to modify the budget, they all share a 
common view that posits four major claims: 1) that the government is generally in control 
of the budget process; 2) that specific institutional arrangements affect the role that 
parliament is able to play in the budget process; 3) that as the number of actors allowed to 
influence the budget increases, fiscal irresponsibility also increases; and 4) that if the 
parliament is allowed to influence the budget, this parliamentary influence will lead to 
greater fiscal irresponsibility. In Part Two, we will discuss how this set of institutional 
arguments applies to the Italian case. In doing so we will show that the Italian 
parliament’s ability to modify the budget was greatly enhanced by very specific 
procedural mechanisms such as secret voting and legislative agenda setting. We will also 
show that as these mechanisms were eliminated or reformed, Italian MPs were 
confronted with a new set of incentives that made interference with the government 
budget proposal more costly. This is why we claim that the magnitude of the parliament-
induced changes to the government budget proposal diminished in the 1990s. In Part 
Three we will argue that while institutional arguments can be successfully used to explain 
why the role of the parliament in the budget process diminished in the 1990s, institutional 
change is by itself insufficient to explain why some of the parliament-induced changes to 
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the budget were actually fiscally responsible for several years during the 1990s. We will 
argue that because of the specific transformation of the contextual conditions within 
which the Italian parliament was operating, fiscal irresponsibility became too costly an 
option for Italian MPs who were hence induced in passing more austere budgets. In the 
fourth and final section of the paper, we will draw some conclusions as to the meaning of 
our findings.  
 
Part One: Parliaments and the Budget 
The annual budget, which details how revenue is to be generated and spent, is probably 
the single most important document a government produces. Because parliamentary 
influence generally leads to greater spending, in most countries parliament’s role is 
purposively restricted by either institutional design or by political considerations .2  
In the first respect, the comparative literature on the role of the legislature for 
national budgeting generally argues that legislative institutions have something to do with 
the government’s ability to protect the content of its budget. In other words, procedures 
available in the legislature matter a great deal. This is because the more institutions allow 
a greater number of actors to influence budgetary politics, the more difficult it is to bring 
budget deficits under control (Poterba and Hagen 1999).  For example, some budgetary 
procedures such as the timing of voting or amendments procedures (Alesina and Perotti 
                                                 
2 Each parliament’s ability to examine, amend, modify, confirm, and approve the budget is constrained by 
both institutional and political factors (Schick 1993; Alt and Lowry, 2000; Wehner 2004). On the 
institutional side, in many countries Parliament’s ability to alter the government’s budget is subject to 
extensive procedural limits (Herman and Mendel, 1976; International Centre for Parliamentary 
Documentation, 1986). For example, in the UK, Parliament can amend tax proposals, but cannot increase 
spending (OECD, 1998). In Germany, parliamentarians’ ability to modify the budget is constrained by 
budget regulations as well as by the expenses generated by current legislation (Wehner, 2001). On the other 
hand, there are countries, such as Belgium and Canada, where there are no institutional limits on 
Parliament’s ability to amend the budget.  In these cases, parliament’s primary job in budgetary politics is 
to review and pass the government’s bill.  
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1999) can create iterative collective action problems in which individual legislators from 
the government and opposition continually find incentives to defect from austerity 
agreements and secure narrow benefits for particular constituencies. This occurs at the 
expense of collective fiscal austerity. 
Scholars have also underlined the importance of other institutional mechanisms in 
determining the extent to which parliaments can modify the budget.  In this regard 
Krafchick and Wehner argue that the impact a legislature can have on the budget depends 
on the formal design of amendment powers in the legislature, the scope of conferred 
powers to change the budget (restricted, unrestricted, or balanced budget), and the role of 
legislative committees (Krafchik and Wehner 1998). Specifically, Krafchik and Wehner 
emphasize that the interaction between these institutional levers structures incentives for 
legislative interference. In their comparative analysis, the authors find that “an effective 
amendment system must combine conferred powers with an entrenched role for 
committees” for an understanding of when parliaments can realistically influence national 
budgeting (ibid: 517). Thus, though some legislatures may grant generous amendment 
procedures within parliament, without conferred powers to alter the budget and an 
effective committee system the true ability of parliament to alter financial legislation is 
limited as in Australia. Conversely, where generous amendment procedures are grouped 
with conferred powers to alter the budget and an effective committee system, there exists 
a real possibility for parliament to alter financial legislation as in Germany.   
The main theme in this literature is that when procedurally permitted, legislatures 
can frustrate governments by altering budget bills and that parliament-induced changes in 
the budget are inevitably fiscally irresponsible. 
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Part Two: The Italian case: Budget, Parliament and Institutional Structure 
Twenty years of parliament-induced changes to the Italian budget tell a partially different 
story. The data presented in Table 1 show the percentage difference between the 
government’s proposal and the parliament’s passed law for the total amount spending in 
the Budget Bill. If there were no parliamentary influence to the government’s proposed 
amount to spend, the percentage difference between the original bill and final law would 
be zero. In such a case, the assumption is that the parliament did not change the bill at all. 
By contrast, changes between the original budget bill and the final law suggest that the 
parliament has extensively amended the government budget proposal.  
 
 
Table 1. Italian Budget Laws for 1982 to 2001. Figures indicate the total amount of spending for each year 
in billions of lire. 
 
For Year 
PROPOSED  
by Government 
PASSED  
by Parliament 
Percent 
Difference 
1982 135460 164087 17% 
1983 172772 203510 15% 
1984 227077 242321 6% 
1985 274163 297597 8% 
1986 280900 334543 16% 
1987 311432 358997 13% 
1988 368360 414814 11% 
1989 388562 406271 4% 
1990 456202 445655 -2% 
1991 498505 509594 2% 
1992 541967 559556 3% 
1993 612696 588981 -4% 
1994 563208 549658 -2% 
1995 611073 611390 0% 
1996 647486 637007 -2% 
1997 633348 642245 1% 
1998 634393 653414 3% 
1999 658278 672500 2% 
2000 673282 679779 1% 
2001 700646 725944 3% 
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These data show quite clearly that the Italian parliament has never acted as a 
‘rubber stamp’ on financial policy at all; instead there were many times that the Italian 
Parliament actively challenged the government’s budget. 
The Italian Parliament’s ability to modify the government budget proposal raises 
two questions: first, what factors allowed the parliament to modify the budget? And 
second, are all the parliament-induced changes of the budget bill fiscally irresponsible as 
the conventional wisdom generally argues? 
Let’s begin with the second question first. Were all parliament-induced changes in 
the budget fiscally irresponsible as assumed in the literature? It depends. If we look at the 
data from the 1981-1988 period, the Italian case is in line with the conventional wisdom. 
The Italian parliament was able to profoundly alter the government budget proposal, and 
these changes were all fiscally irresponsible. But if we look at the data from 1990 
onward, the Italian case becomes somewhat exceptional in the light of the traditional 
expectation. The parliament-induced changes became much smaller and were, in several 
years, fiscally responsible, meaning that the parliament agreed to spend less than what the 
government originally proposed. Hence, while the evidence concerning the 1981-1988 
period is consistent with the conventional wisdom, the data after 1990 point in the 
direction of a sort of Italian exceptionalism.  
In the light of this possible exceptionalism, one should reformulate the first 
question. Instead of asking what factors allowed the Italian Parliament to modify the 
budget, we should ask two new questions, based on the fact that there was a difference in 
both the degree and kind of changes made to the budget before and after 1990: a) what 
factors were responsible for the parliament’s ability to modify the budget and to pass 
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fiscally irresponsible budgets in the 1980s?; and b) what factors are responsible for the 
parliament’s new role in the budget process in the 1990s? 
 
The Old Story 
 
Let us begin with addressing question a). The reason why the Italian Parliament was able 
to manipulate the budget between 1981 and 1988 is consistent with what the institutional 
literature, that we have previously recalled, has underlined: the Parliament’s ability to 
modify the budget depends on very specific institutional and procedural factors. The 
Italian case, in the 1980s, was no exception to this rule. Indeed, for most of the history of 
the First Republic, the budget was procedurally open to parliamentary influence. This 
stands in contrast to other countries that deliberately restrict the exposure politicians can 
have to the budget’s content. Below we describe two unique procedures that explain in 
part how Italian parliamentary politicians could change the budget so effectively and 
almost easily. These include the provision for secret voting and an inclusive agenda 
setting process in parliament.3 In recognition of the damaging effects these institutions 
had for financial austerity, beginning the late 1980s the Parliament ultimately decided to 
reverse some of these institutions to restrict the magnitude of legislative influence. In turn 
these changes have significantly influenced the pattern of parliamentary influence in the 
budget. 
 Until 1988, the Standing Orders of parliament allowed secret voting. This means 
that before 1988, there is no official record on how each MP voted in Parliament. Only 
the number and names of those present and voting were recorded and counted. 
                                                 
3 For an interesting discussion of the importance of agenda setting see Doering (2001). 
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Consequently it is not possible to gather any information as to whether an individual MP 
voted yes, no, or abstained for all secret votes.4 Though the government should have had 
enough support to pass its bills, the government was often defeated (and embarrassingly 
so) many times on key bills – including budget bills – during the First Republic. This 
problem often stalemated the executive and caused numerous governments to collapse. 
Ironically, these stalemates occurred during times of oversized government, when the 
government should have been able to garner enough support from the legislature to pass 
its bills. But once a government lost a vote, party whips from the government parties 
could not know who was responsible for the defeat.  
The use of the secret vote is important to understand how parliament was able to 
influence budgetary legislation for so long before the rules for voting changed. Before 
1988 government party members could defect from party mandates without sanction 
from the party. These same government party members could then go on to log-roll with 
other government party members or even members of opposition parties to pass 
particularistic pork-style legislation for their own constituencies to ensure re-election. But 
again, since no official record was kept the government could not formally reprimand 
individual defectors.  
A second procedural factor that undermined governments’ ability to control their 
majorities and protect their budget involved the procedures concerning parliamentary 
agenda setting. In 1971 the Italian Parliament passed reforms to implement a unique 
agenda setting formula that extended veto power to a leader from each parliamentary 
group during the determination of the legislative agenda and calendar. The vote rule for 
                                                 
4 Italian MPs can either abstain or partake in parliamenatry votes. İf they participate in votes, they have 
three options: yes, no or abstension, which means voting neither yes or no. On these issues see Landi and 
Pelizzo (2006). 
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this group was unanimity: every party leader (including those from the opposition) had to 
agree to the parliamentary agenda, otherwise parliament would have no calendar. This 
unique rule gave opposition party leaders considerable leverage over what issues would 
be discussed in both committees and on the floor, and perhaps more importantly, the 
timetable and procedures for debate and voting (for example the agenda setting group 
could determine in advance if a vote would be subject to the secret ballot or not). 
Setting the parliamentary agenda is an extremely important tool to manipulate 
public policy. The agenda details which issues will be discussed and how much time will 
be allotted to each issue. The timing of voting is equally important as well. For example, 
in 1986 the Italian government suffered a significant setback when the order of voting for 
the Financial Bill was discussed.5 The Minister of the Treasury from the Christian 
Democratic Party wanted to vote on the total spending amount in Article 1 first in order 
to set an upper cap for spending, but the opposition parties argued their preference to vote 
on other articles first and on Article 1 last. The opposition clearly did not want to limit 
the amount of money Parliament could commit to spending, and knew that it could, 
through subsequent amendments, raise the overall amount as long as a ceiling was not 
already set. The crucial point is that the agenda setting process in the Italian Parliament 
allowed the opposition to hold the government hostage. They prohibited the government 
from imposing a voting timetable unattractive to the opposition. As a result the 
government was ultimately defeated, the overall amount of spending from the 
government’s original proposal increased, and the Finance Law was passed two months 
                                                 
5 The Financial Bill sets the upper limit of what the government is willing to finance for spending above its 
traditional sources of income. 
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late. Writing in 1988, before any reforms to the agenda setting process had passed, della 
Sala argued: 
 
The important point about this discussion on what seems to be a technical 
point is that it highlights the fact that the government has few guarantees 
over the fate of its program once it reaches Parliament…The government 
was defeated over an issue it saw as crucial for achieving its objectives 
primarily because it had few levers which it could pull once the bill 
reached Parliament. (della Sala 1988:121). 
 
Granting opposition party leaders control over agenda setting clearly prohibited 
governments from imposing unattractive budget bills, even when the first preference of 
the government may have been to introduce more austerity.  
 It would be a mistake to consider these particular institutions as the only ones 
responsible for parliament’s ability to alter the budget. Other institutions, such as the 
committee system, should also be considered.6 In many ways, these additional 
                                                 
6 Another significant institutional factor empowering Parliament was Italy’s pre-1993 electoral system. 
Until 1993, when it was reformed by the laws 276/93 and 277/93, the Italian electoral system was a 
Proportional Representation system (Fusaro, 1995; Katz, 1995; Katz, 2001). This PR was coupled with 
preference voting, which allowed voters to express their preference for specific candidates. Voters had the 
possibility to express up to three or four such preferences until 1991, when, in the wake of the referendum 
the number of preferences that voters could express on the ballot was reduced to only one (Pasquino, 1993; 
Pasquino, 1996). The PR system with single preference (preferenza unica) was used only in the 1992 
elections. The preference voting in both its pre-1991 and its post-1991 version affected the political 
behavior of voters as well as of the elected officials. Candidates were concerned not only within between-
parties competition but also within-parties competition with their fellow party candidates. This is important 
because it gave individual MPs strong incentives to secure constituency benefits and to gain popularity and 
name recognition. The more benefits an MP managed to secure for her potential voters the more preference 
votes the MP could expect to receive in the next election. Because of the preference vote, opposition 
members knew that engaging in collaborative activities with members of other parties could result in 
increased constituency benefits for all MPs. With the removal of the secret vote in 1988, the passage of 
reforms in 1990 to allow the President of the Chamber to impose a parliamentary agenda, and the 
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procedures had interactive effects with the provision for secret voting and the inclusive 
agenda setting process. Once the excessive use of the secret vote was removed and once 
agenda control was returned to government’s majority in Parliament, these additional 
institutions had less ‘bite’. But they still exist within the Parliament (in other words, they 
haven’t been reformed) and one institutional level in particular should be mentioned 
because of how it was used before the reforms removed the secret vote and opposition 
agenda veto. 
 This third institutional element involves parliamentary committees. While there 
are different types of committees7, the sede legislativa (legislative committee) is the most 
interesting and involves a set of unique procedures. Assignment of a bill to the sede 
legislativa means that a committee is given permission to pass a bill directly, without 
referral to plenary for final approval. The procedure obviously gives these committees a 
great deal of deciding power.  
When the parliamentary agenda was determined by unanimous consent of all 
party leaders, it was possible for the opposition parties to hold bills hostage until the 
group decided to allow a bill to be decided by a legislative committee. And they had great 
reason for doing so. Since a bill would not have to be referred back to the plenary for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
introduction of the single preference 1991, the system of incentives was dramatically transformed. The 
benefits of defecting had declined because the costs of defecting had increased. The cost of defecting 
increased even more after the 1993 electoral reform and the ensuing transformation of the Italian party 
system. Therefore, if institutional theories are correct in arguing that institutions provide actors with 
incentives to engage or not in certain activities, then as the institutional changes made defections from party 
lines more costly for Italian MPs, the parliament’s influence on the budget bill was bound to decline 
because MPs were less willing to risk exposure. 
7 As it is known, in Italy there are four types committees ‘sittings’ to which a bill may be referred during 
the agenda setting process. The first three involve investigative and reporting functions. There is the sede 
referente (reference committee) in which committees are asked to deliver a report for a bill that will be 
debated in the future in the chamber. Similarly, there is the sede redigente (writing committee) in which 
committees are asked to deliver a report for a bill that is currently being debated in the chamber. The sede 
consultiva (consultative committee) is used when a committee is asked to deliver a report to another 
committee. The last is the sede legislativa (legislative session). 
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final decision, a small group of legislators could develop collaborative techniques to 
ensure passage of their own particularistic legislation. Indeed, a study in 1977 revealed 
the almost all issues are decided with unanimous consent in these committees (di Palma 
1977). This pattern of logrolling among committee members put more and more pressure 
on the budget. Spending generally increased each time a legislative committee passed a 
measure.  
With the ability to defect from party lines without running the risk of being caught 
and possibly punished through the use of the secret vote, MPs from the government 
coalition had little incentive to preserve the (more or less) fiscally austere measured 
proposed by the government that they were supposed to support. Furthermore, with the 
ability to contribute to the setting of the agenda and with the power of keeping bills 
hostage (before they were actually referred to a committee or within the committee 
itself), opposition parties were in a position to collaborate with government party 
members that allowed them all to exercise some influence in the drafting of the budget, to 
get measures beneficial to their constituents approved, and to make the budget even more 
fiscally irresponsible. 
 
The New Story 
 
The data from the 1990s onward, as we mentioned before, tell a very different story. The 
parliament’s ability to alter the government budget proposal diminished dramatically and 
some parliament-induced changes in the budget were actually fiscally responsible. What 
factors are responsible for these changes?  
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Institutional reforms played a considerable role in this respect. Reforms of some 
of the procedural mechanisms noted above that had provided an incentive for 
parliament’s major and fiscally irresponsible role in the budget process provided MPs 
with an incentive to be more fiscally responsible.    
Before 1988, one of the key factors that provided MPs with an incentive to defect 
from party lines or from the lines of the government coalition was that defecting was 
possibly beneficial and virtually costless. One could enjoy the benefits from defecting 
without the risk of paying the price for breaking party lines because voting was secret and 
it was literally impossible to know how individual MPs had voted on a bill. However, 
once reform legislation passed in 1988 abolished the provision of secret voting (except 
for very special circumstances such as for a vote of no confidence) the dynamics of the 
Parliament changed dramatically. The open vote (il voto palese) is now required for the 
great majority of all bills, including budgetary bills. This means that any defections from 
government party mandates can now be identified and potentially punished. The data 
presented in Table 1 confirm that this one institutional change had its intended effect. As 
the cost of defecting increased, MPs became more loyal to their government. The amount 
of difference between the government’s original proposal and the parliamentary passed 
law dropped from 11% to 4% in just one year, from 1988 to 1989. Clearly fewer 
government party MPs were willing to go against their own parties to secure 
particularistic benefits. Removing the secret vote forced government party members to 
respect the demands of their whips.  
Agenda setting was the second procedure that was responsible for the Italian 
parliament’s ability to modify the government budget proposal and to pass fiscally 
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irresponsible measures. Agenda setting procedures were also modified in the 1990s to 
remove the opposition’s veto. Currently, the President of the Chamber of Deputies 
imposes an agenda when a unanimous vote does not pass. Therefore, because the 
government could finally take control over the fate of their own bills, parliament’s ability 
to influence the budget declined. 
 In sum, reforms to the use of secret voting and inclusive agenda setting that had 
allowed so much parliamentary interference for so many years had their intended effects. 
Parliament’s ability to amend the budget declined noticeably.   
 
Part Three: Fiscal responsibility and new contextual conditions 
 
Institutional arguments explain why the role of the Italian parliament in the budget 
process became less pronounced after 1988. But we are still left with a puzzle. Reforms 
to the institutions alone do not explain why the government’s budget became more 
fiscally responsible in parliament for several years during the 1990s. This finding is 
inconsistent with the conventional wisdom which argues that parliamentary changes to 
the budget bill are always increase the amount of spending. How do we explain this 
anomaly?  
Part of the answer for why the parliament behaved more responsibly in the 1990s 
could begin with an acknowledgement of the extreme fiscal irresponsibility created by 
the creative accounting of Bettino Craxi’s political machine (craxismo) and the five-party 
coalitions that dominated Italian governments for many years (pentapartito). Such fiscal 
irresponsibility may have been so extensive that it could not possibly be surpassed. There 
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is obviously some truth in this explanation. But this argument provides an incomplete 
answer. The reason why the Italian parliament became more fiscally responsible cannot 
be entirely reduced to a reaction against the fiscal irresponsibility of the previous years. 
Why would parliamentarians, who have always considered the passing of irresponsible 
budgets acceptable, modify their preferences as to what kind of budget should actually be 
passed? Why would Italian MPs feel the need to react against the fiscal irresponsibility of 
the previous years? 
Our answer is that while the parliament’s ability to modify the budget bill does 
indeed depend generally on institutional and political factors for reasons we have 
explained, parliamentary officials ultimately decided to change their own behavior 
because of very specific contextual factors. These contextual factors include both 
domestic and international realities that Italian politicians had to face. We admit that 
these factors are difficult to quantify in comparative context, nonetheless they are 
extremely important and greatly explain why at a very specific point in time Italian 
legislators had strong collective incentives to induce financial austerity.  
With the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Communist regime in 
Soviet Union, the Italian Communist Party that had posed an electoral threat to the 
Christian Democratic rule for many decades also underwent a significant process of 
transformation. This process was marked by the creation of the Democratic Party of the 
Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra PDS) and later by the creation of the Democrats 
of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra DS). The process of transformation of the PCI into 
new political parties was eventful because the established parties could no longer justify 
reckless spending to prohibit the perceived threat from coming to power. In other words, 
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the large left wing party was no longer considered an anti-system, uncoalitionable party 
(Sartori 1976).  Now it was a real contender and as such the fairly corrupt governing 
parties could not use budgetary power to distribute constituency-level pork in exchange 
for electoral support. 
A second change occurred in 1991 with the signing of the Maastricht treaty. The 
creation of the European Union and the introduction of a European single currency had 
strong implications for the Italian political system. The countries willing to join the EMU 
had to respect the convergence criteria set in the Maastricht Treaty, which spelled out 
very specific requirements.8 In the beginning in the early 1990s, virtually all Italian 
political parties (including the Northern League, who would later become fervently anti-
European) were in favor of joining the EMU. This political consensus was matched by a 
large favorable majority in the Italian electorate. The need to respect or at least to 
converge toward these criteria had a remarkable impact on the Italian parliament’s ability 
to shape the budget. All political actors were now under some pressure to approve a 
budget bill that could help Italy respect/approach the convergence criteria. 
A third change occurred in 1992. In 1992, systemic corruption of the Italian 
political system was uncovered. The Bribesville scandal (Tangentopoli), revealed by the 
investigations of the Clean Hands Movement (Mani Pulite), effectively put an end to the 
existence of the main parties of the First Republic and to the career of many prominent 
politicians. The discovery of Bribesville sparked major anti-party (and anti-politicians) 
sentiments in the Italian population. In essence Italian voters wanted to start over. They 
                                                 
8 To join the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty required a public deficit of less than 3 per cent of GDP, a public 
debt of less than 60 per cent of GDP, exchange rate stability, an inflation rate that could not exceed more 
than 1.5 per cent the average of the three states with the lowest inflation, and long-term interest rates not 
exceeding by more than 2 per cent the average of the three states with the lowest interest rates. 
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wanted Italy to join Europe with the hope that Italian/EU politicians would be more 
competent and more honest than traditional Italian politicians. Furthermore, they wanted 
the economic benefits as well. The Euro-zone gave many Italians, and especially Italian 
entrepreneurs, the illusion that new, larger markets could be conquered and more profits 
could be made—among other reasons because by having a single currency, one no longer 
had to pay the fees for exchanging one currency into another. To say whether the 
European Union and the single currency have delivered all the good things that Italian 
voters had hoped for is beyond the purpose of this paper. But one thing is clear: Italian 
voters wanted the single currency, they wanted to be in what was to become the Euro-
zone, and they wanted the politicians to take the necessary steps to respect the 
convergence criteria. 
Under these circumstances, with a crumbling political system, with a very 
dissatisfied society, with considerable pressure to join Europe, and with some strict 
criteria to respect, a highly de-legitimized political class could not afford to make 
mistakes: they had to pass a fiscally responsible budget. Their own electoral success 
depended on it. 
 Contextual conditions are extremely difficult to quantify comparatively however 
we believe that in this case the story of the budget cannot be understood without 
reference to these specific historical circumstances. The political story concerning the 
traditional tension between the Italian Communists and traditional governing parties (the 
Christian Democrats and the Italian Socialists especially) and the presence of certain 
institutional procedures available in parliament help us understand how the budget was 
open to parliamentary influence for so long. But the historical context of the 1990s helps 
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us understand why MPs ultimately decided to curb their own spending behavior in the 
interest of financial austerity. Clearly the economic threat coming from a perceived 
concern that Italy would not meet the criteria for the Maastricht Treaty compelled MPs to 
modify their own behavior. Here we believe that the collective benefit of austerity greatly 
outweighed any benefits individuals could receive. Taken together, these factors explain 
why national budgeting in Italy was so dramatically modified, both in degree and in kind.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We have argued that the conventional wisdom concerning parliaments’ role in budgeting 
suggests that parliamentary interference leads to less fiscally responsible budgets. 
Parliaments – and the individuals within them – generally want to secure benefits for 
either themselves or their constituencies. While this may be true across many 
parliaments, our data suggest a significant anomaly in the Italian case. During most of the 
1980s, the Italian Parliament indeed served to increase significantly the overall amount 
the government could commit to spending. We have argued that the parliament’s ability 
to amend the budget so dramatically was contingent on very specific institutional factors 
such as the provision for secret voting and an inclusive agenda setting process. These 
particular procedures interacted with other institutional factors to provide extreme 
incentives for MPs to change the budget recklessly for their own benefits. In the 1980s, 
MPs greatly used these institutional resources to their advantage and as a result the 
parliament continually passed irresponsible budgets. While this story is interesting in its 
own right, such parliamentary interference is not unexpected. Our empirical observations 
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fit theoretical expectations: in the 1980s, institutional mechanisms allowed parliaments to 
change government proposals and this extensive parliamentary influence led to more 
financially irresponsible budgets. 
 But something curious happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and something 
completely unexpected happened later in the 1990s. First, in the late 1980s the Parliament 
stopped passing irresponsible budgets. While the Parliament was still involved in raising 
the overall levels of spending, the degree of this influence was greatly lowered. We argue 
that this reduction was due to the removal of the specific procedural mechanisms that for 
so many years had allowed such extensive parliamentary influence. Here theories of 
“new institutionalism” ring very true: changes in the institutional structure of a 
parliament produced changes in parliamentary outcomes. Here the outcome relates to the 
degree of parliamentary influence in the national budget. The budget was still modified to 
spend more, but the degree to which the parliament was able to increase the budget was 
dramatically lowered. 
 But a second change occurred in the mid-1990s, when the Parliament decided to 
change the budget, not to spend more, but to spend less than the government’s original 
proposal. This completely defies expectation and turns the conventional wisdom about 
parliamentary influence on its head. Here parliamentary interference led to less spending. 
In this respect we argued that while institutional changes were responsible for reducing 
MPs ability to modify the budget, specific contextual factors were responsible for making 
Italian MPs more fiscally responsible. We argue that understanding the contextual story 
is very important for an appreciation of the pressure Italian MPs were under to bring the 
budget under control. In this respect we underlined the importance of changes both at the 
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international and domestic levels. On the international front, the drive to participate in the 
new European economic system provided immediate reasons to induce austerity. At the 
same time, the balance of world power had changed and the stalemate between the 
Communists and governing parties was finally relieved. Rather than simply serving as an 
impossible alternative to government, new left-wing parties became potential government 
candidates. This meant that the traditional parties could no longer use their hegemonic 
power to secure particularistic benefits that would guarantee their own re-election. 
Suddenly incentives for collaborative behavior to secure particularistic benefits became 
constrained. Furthermore, on the domestic front corruption scandals involving all the 
established parties fatigued voters, who wanted to welcome a new type of politics. They 
were no longer willing to reward irresponsible politicians with their vote.  
 The intersection of these contextual factors – the fall of international 
Communism, the drive to participate in Europe, and the domestic revelation of the 
magnitude of political corruption – combined at a particular point in Italian political 
history. Italian MPs could no longer afford to pass irresponsible budgets. The outcome, 
both to them as individuals and to Italy as a whole, would be too costly. For these reasons 
they greatly defied expectation and passed budgets that actually spent less than what their 
governments had proposed. 
 We believe our story has implications, not only for the Italian context, but for 
others potentially as well. We have shown that the conventional wisdom concerning the 
relationship between parliamentary influence and budgetary outcomes is generally true 
most of the time. However, we believe we have also shown that parliamentarians can be 
given incentives to change their own behavior and defy expectations, as long as the cost 
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of not changing their behavior is high enough. In this case, the trend of reckless spending 
might have cost Italy a valuable place in the new European economic system. For 
Italians, this would have been devastating. While such big moments are not normally 
expected in a parliament’s yearly cycle, we believe one lesson of our story suggests that 
increasing globalization might compel both governments and parliaments to respect 
particular economic parameters, even when their first preference may be to secure more 
for themselves. Global considerations may thus trump individual preferences and serve to 
introduce increased austerity in national budgeting, despite the institutional or political 
framework in which parliaments operate. In such a case, the conventional wisdom of 
parliamentary influence needs to be qualified.  
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